Mongols, Cheetahs, and Slaves on Horseback

In early September 1260 CE, the forces of Mongol general Kitbugha clashed in the Jezreel Valley with the Mamluk regiments of Sultan Qutuz. The Mamluk victory at the Battle of Ain Jalut was hailed as the first significant defeat of a Mongol army—previously considered invincible—and it immensely bolstered the prestige of the young Mamluk regime. The Mongol retreat across the Euphrates initiated a sixty-year struggle, during which the Mongols repeatedly attempted to cross the river and annex the Mamluk state. These efforts were led first by Hulegu, grandson of the empire's founder Chinggis Khan, and later by his successors, the rulers of the Mongol Ilkhanate in Iran.

The site of the Battle of Ain Jalut, also known as Ein Harod.

Mongols attacking the other side of the world: Japan.

The rise of the Mamluk Sultanate, whose ruling class consisted of military slaves—mostly Turks imported from the Eurasian steppe—occurred against a backdrop of prolonged weakness and fragmentation in the Muslim world. This instability had allowed foreign powers to penetrate the Middle East. A feeble response from eastern Muslim entities facilitated the westward expansion of the Mongol war machine, while political division along the Mediterranean coast allowed the Crusader movement to establish Frankish states from northern Syria to southern Palestine.

Mongol raids into Syria and Palestine, and the Frankish kingdoms, circa 1260.

Furthermore, the Nizari Ismailis—the radical Shiite sect dubbed "Assassins" by their enemies—specialized in the targeted killing of Sunni leaders and the occasional Frank. They continued to terrorize Greater Syria even after their Iranian centers, including the notorious fortress of Alamut, were razed during Hulegu’s westward campaign.

Not exactly friendly: Nizari Ismailis—"Assassins" as they appear in popular culture.

The situation looked bleak for a young Muslim dynasty trying to find its way in the chaotic world of the mid-13th century.

The survival of the Mamluk Sultanate against the Mongol war machine can be attributed to the leadership of one of the greatest commanders the Islamic world has ever known: Sultan Baybars.

Al-Malik al-Zahir Rukn al-Din Baybars, a Turk from Kipchak north of the Caspian, was captured as a youth and sold for 800 silver dirhams—a relatively low price for a Mamluk, perhaps due to a white cataract in one eye that lowered his market value. Regardless, the young slave eventually reached Egypt, where he entered the service of the Ayyubid dynasty founded by Saladin.

The cheetah: the symbol of Baybars, carved into the Lions' Gate in Jerusalem—or, if you prefer, the Cheetahs' Gate.

Following the Mamluk coup, in which slaves rose against their masters to found one of history's most fascinating political entities, Baybars became deputy to Qutuz. He was likely involved in Qutuz's assassination during a hunting trip in October 1260.

Baybars had no time to enjoy the luxuries of power. It was clear the Mongols would not sit idly by with their bows unstrung after their defeat at Ain Jalut; they would inevitably attempt to reinvade Greater Syria. The measures taken by Baybars and his successors proved effective, as the Sultanate survived for many years after the Mongol Empire itself disintegrated.

Baybars' first step was to reorganize and significantly expand the Mamluk army. The number of cavalrymen, the Mamluk spearhead, was tripled or quadrupled to approximately thirty-five thousand. These elite horsemen, almost all military slaves of Turkic origin—though there were also Mongols, Slavs, and others among them—were highly skilled in the use of the composite bow, the lance, and the cavalry sword. Their absolute mastery of mounted combat was forged through years of grueling training known as *furusiyya*, which included weapons drills, mounted archery maneuvers, and wrestling.

Not the kind of guy you bring home to mother: a Mamluk warrior.

Mamluk *furusiyya* training.

As part of the military buildup, Baybars personally purchased many youths from the steppe to train for elite units. Additionally, the Mamluk auxiliary forces, known as the *halqa*, were expanded to include Arabs and Kurds loyal to the previous Ayyubid regime. To these were added refugees fleeing Mongol terror, including Turkmen tribesmen, Persians, and even entire Mongol tribal units that defected. One such group, the Oirats, settled in Cairo. It was noted that they were not Muslims, tended toward gang activity, and, to the horror of proponents of halal slaughter, killed horses by striking them on the head for food.

The final element in building Mamluk power was the tribal factor: the Bedouins and Turkmen of Syria and Palestine were recruited as intelligence agents and provided horses for the army.

The next strategic step was political and administrative centralization. Baybars placed Mamluks directly subordinate to him at the head of various provinces, replacing the local princes who had ruled since Ayyubid times. His ability to hold the reins of the Sultanate’s three components—nomads, sedentary populations, and the Mamluk elite—was made possible by his organizational skill, his prestige as the vanquisher of the Mongols, and his charismatic personality.

However, before Baybars could feel any satisfaction with his growing kingdom, there was one bone he had to pull from his throat: a European bone.

The Franks (Crusaders), with their fortified cities along the eastern Mediterranean coast, had dominated the Middle Eastern military scene for most of the 12th century. Even after their defeat at the Battle of Hattin (1187) and the reduction of the Kingdom of Jerusalem's territory, the Crusader kingdom and the principalities of Tripoli and Antioch remained significant factors. Given the political fragmentation of the Muslims after Saladin's death, they had even managed to increase their hold on the territory.

Furthermore, the traditional Mongol stance of total surrender or complete destruction began to soften toward the Crusaders after the loss at Ain Jalut. Contacts between them and the Franks were seen by Mamluk eyes as a burgeoning alliance, though in practice it was likely far from realization.

It is no surprise that shortly after taking power and stabilizing Mamluk rule, the Sultan turned his gaze toward the Crusader cities. After 1263, Baybars and his successors began a systematic campaign to eradicate the European presence on the Syrian coast. This campaign unfolded in two main periods: 1265–1271 and 1289–1291. Between these, large-scale attacks were launched against Armenian Cilicia, which was linked to Crusader Antioch and Tripoli, as well as against Ismaili strongholds in Mount Lebanon and Syria. The pause in activity was also due to Baybars' death in 1277 and the short-lived reigns of his sons.

The rise of the talented general Sayf al-Din Qalawun in 1280 was met almost immediately by a large-scale invasion of Syria by the Ilkhan Abaqa (1281), followed by challenges from rival Mamluks. But once his rule stabilized, the decisive attacks against the Crusaders continued, involving the systematic conquest and destruction of their cities and ports. Qalawun's son, al-Ashraf Khalil, completed the task with the conquest of the last Crusader stronghold in Acre in 1291. This period also included a "root canal" for the remnants of the Ismailis, confiscating their assets and imprisoning their leaders. Persistent resistance led to a campaign against their fortresses, all of which were captured by 1273. Shortly after their surrender, Baybars utilized their services against the Franks, but the sect's role was effectively over; after the 13th century, there is no evidence of assassinations carried out by Syrian Nizaris in the sect's name.

The fall of Crusader Acre, 1291.

At this stage, with the kingdom purged of foreign and subversive elements, the third Mamluk strategy went into effect.

This pillar of strategy involved the total destruction of many fortresses throughout the Middle East, particularly coastal fortifications such as Ashkelon and Acre. This was intended to prevent future Frankish invasions from establishing coastal bridgeheads. The Mamluks then selected a limited number of fortresses to preserve and expand. The choice of which to raze and which to reinforce was dictated by Mongol invasion routes toward Syrian cities. Consequently, paramount importance was given to fortresses on the Euphrates, near Aleppo and Hama.

Although Mamluk fortresses were built under the Sultan's personal supervision and regularly maintained, their survival depended on the ability to dispatch relief regiments within days. Baybars' ability to organize efficient expeditionary armies significantly reduced the Mongol army's ability to recapture these sites. Military relief usually came from the Syrian cities or from Cairo, rather than neighboring forts. The number of men in each garrison was carefully calculated; even in emergencies, a garrison could not afford to leave to help a nearby site. Instead, they sent word to the cities, which organized reinforcements alongside the Sultan's army departing from Cairo. Relying on external help for the Euphrates fortresses seemed like a dangerous gamble, but the Mamluks never changed their method, and assistance rarely arrived late.

A Mamluk stronghold: Nimrod Fortress in the Golan Heights.

Despite its robustness, the Mamluk border system's ability to withstand a prolonged siege relied heavily on the reaction speed of regiments in central Syria and Cairo. Early in Baybars' reign, the need for a communication and supervision mechanism to control newly annexed Syrian territory was clear. The Sultanate's ability to maintain an efficient, centralized communication system over time is impressive evidence of its organizational consistency.

The establishment of the Mamluk communication mechanism, the *barid* or courier mail, began around 1260. This system, based on fast couriers moving through fixed stations with fresh horses and supplies, allowed urgent news to travel between Cairo and the edges of the Sultanate within four days—and sometimes, in emergencies, within three.

Mamlukia.

Establishing the network required a massive investment, which Baybars provided. However, maintenance was made affordable by the fact that many network officials were Mamluks themselves. Additionally, in the Syrian Desert and along the coast, Bedouin and Turkmen tribes were appointed to guard stations and supply horses in exchange for specific benefits—further evidence of the state's ability to mobilize nomads for its needs.

The central *barid* route from Cairo to Damascus passed through Gaza, Lydda, Jenin, the Jezreel Valley, Beth Shean, and Irbid. Secondary routes branched off through Beit Guvrin to Kerak, and through Hattin to Safed. The fortress of Safed became a vital administrative center after its conquest in 1266. From Damascus, the route split: one path continued northeast to al-Rahba, and the other headed north through Aleppo to al-Bira. These last two stations were the critical Euphrates fortresses, the first to face a Mongol attack from Iran.

In addition to the courier road, al-Rahba and al-Bira were the final stations for two other networks: pigeon post and a signaling system. The signaling system, using flaming beacons at night and smoke by day, was the fastest way to warn of approaching enemies. Stations on mountain peaks allowed a warning to be transmitted from the Euphrates to Gaza, from where carrier pigeons were sent to Cairo—all within a single day.

Pigeon post had been used in the region for centuries, but the Mamluks professionalized it. During Sultan Qalawun's meeting with a delegation from the Ilkhan Ahmad Tegüder in 1284, a carrier pigeon arrived announcing the Ilkhan's death. The news caused the Ilkhan's ambassador such distress that he died a few days later. While beacons and pigeons were the fastest methods, they were limited to general messages and vulnerable to sabotage or interception. To mitigate this, the Mamluks used a protocol of dual dispatch for every pigeon message. It was the combination of these three communication methods that brought the system to optimal efficiency.

Taken as a whole, the fortification and warning system proved itself. After the failure of the fifth attempt to conquer al-Bira (1275), the Ilkhanid armies began seeking routes that bypassed the fortresses. Even deep within Syrian territory, they preferred to avoid sieges, recognizing their limitations, and tried instead to draw the Mamluk army into open battle.

The Mamluk defense mechanism remained unchanged even after this shift in Mongol strategy. The final siege of al-Rahba in 1312 triggered the same chain of reactions: a message to the Syrian cities, reinforcements from Cairo, and a rapid military response. The reliance on external aid remained a calculated risk, but one that consistently paid off.

In 1323, a peace treaty was signed between Sultan Muhammad ibn Qalawun and the Ilkhan Abu Sa'id, ending sixty years of bitter enmity. The Ilkhanid state began to disintegrate after Abu Sa'id's death a decade later, weakened by internal friction. The Mamluk Sultanate, by contrast, endured as an independent entity for another two hundred years, until the arrival of the Ottoman Turks and firearms.

An evaluation of Mamluk policy leaves no doubt as to the success of their defensive strategy. The recognition that Mongol aggression was an existential threat led Baybars and his successors to adopt a dual strategy to meet the challenge.

First, the army was expanded and its institutions reorganized. Systems for communication, espionage, and nomadic alliances were created to support military needs, alongside the reinforcement of strategic fortifications.

Second, a firm border policy was adopted, ensuring a swift response to any hostile activity east of the Euphrates. Military activity was moved into Mongol territory or that of their allies whenever possible to thwart attacks in advance. Additionally, an extensive intelligence network deep within Ilkhanid territory allowed the state to obtain valuable information and defend itself proactively.

The ability to maintain constant alertness and mobilize forces quickly could only be achieved by an efficient, centralized government. The Sultan's efforts to repair damage after every Mongol attack and to restock weapon and food stores are the ultimate testament to the strength of the Mamluk military structure. Despite the Mongol reputation for invincibility, the Mamluks maintained supreme vigilance for six decades, ensuring their survival while the empire of the Khans faded into history.